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Developing countryIn a developing country, terrorists recruit and allocate their capital, skilled labor, and unskilled labor between
domestic and foreign targets. Domestic targets require less skilled labor than foreign targets. Under various
strategic scenarios, we show how countermeasures against the different terrorist inputs alter the amount and
mix of targets, as well as how skilled and unskilled immigration quotas by a targeted foreign country affect
this mix of attacks. We ﬁnd that increases in skilled labor quotas generally reduce terrorist attacks in the foreign
country, especially when the terrorists reside in a skill-scarce country. A number of different strategic scenarios,
including leader–follower, are investigated.
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Ever since the unprecedented terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001 (henceforth 9/11), economists have focused on myriad aspects
of terrorism including its growth impact (Gaibulloev and Sandler,
2008), its development consequences (Keefer and Loayza, 2008), its
economic costs (e.g., Abadie andGardeazabal, 2003), and its counterter-
rorism implications (Sandler and Siqueira, 2006). Researchers applied
game-theoretic tools to investigate the practice of counterterrorism
against domestic and transnational terrorism (see e.g., Bapat, 2011).
Another strand of the literature relates to trade and/or foreign directpartment of Homeland Security
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dyopadhyay),
. Open access under CC BY-NC-SA liceinvestment (e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008), wherein terrorism
curbs trade and capital ﬂows owing to heightened costs and risks.
Despite these contributions, there is no previous analysis that
formally connects immigration policy in a developed (home) country,
say H, to the supply of terrorism from a developing (foreign) country,
say F, in a general equilibrium context that accounts for various interna-
tional externalities. This is an important omission because an exclusive
focus on the standard terms-of-trade effects of immigration policy may
result in misleading policy recommendations.2 The purpose of this
paper is to ﬁll this void by integrating immigration and counterterror-
ism policies in alternative strategic frameworks, allowing for proactive
and defensive countermeasures. We show that there is a previously
unrecognized interplay between counterterrorismmeasures in a devel-
oping country F, which hosts the terrorists, and labor quotas in a devel-
oped countryH.3 Studies that focused on known transnational terrorists
found that many were immigrants to the targeted country (e.g., Leiken
and Brooke, 2006; Sageman, 2004).42 In this context, terms-of-trade effect refers to the wages of skilled or unskilled immi-
grants that the developed nation has to pay. A fall in the immigrant's wage is a terms-of-
trade gain for the developed nation.
3 In our paper, host country F is where the terrorist group is based; it is not the country
hosting the immigrants.
4 Dreher et al. (2011) showed that terrorist attacks resulted in skilled, not unskilled, la-
bor migration, which raises the question of how these migrants might affect terrorism
abroad.
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draws unskilled and skilled labor from the productive sector to attack tar-
gets at home and abroad. These two types of laborers join the terrorist
group when their anticipated gain exceeds that in the productive sector;
this decision is inﬂuenced bywages, radicalization, and counterterrorism-
induced risks of failure. Hitting targets abroad in a developed country
relies on skilled labor from the terrorist organization, whereas hitting
targets at home relies on unskilled labor from the organization. This
follows because attacks abroad require possessing language skills, oper-
ating with reduced infrastructure, overcoming security safeguards, and
traversing borders. Chivers and Rohde (2002) documented that terror-
ists sent abroad required much greater skills than guerrillas ﬁghting at
home. These skills included map reading, logistical training, bomb-
making knowledge, and electrical engineering that unskilled laborers
are unlikely to possess or master (also, see Campos and Gassebner,
2013). All four pilots of the 9/11 hijackings had higher education with
two possessing engineering degrees, as did Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,
who planned 9/11 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, 2004). The two primary perpetrators of the bombing of
the Glasgow International Airport on June 30, 2007 were an engineer
with ties to Iraq and a PhD student from India (Mickolus, 2008). Based
on interviews and ﬁeld work, Sageman (2004, p. 78) concluded that
75% of his terrorist sample, most of whom engaged in transnational
terrorism, were professionals or semi-skilled. Benmelech and Berrebi
(2007) showed that terrorist groups assigned their better educated
and skilled operatives to the most demanding missions.
We present alternative strategic scenarios. In a simultaneous game,
the developing country F applies proactive countermeasures against
terrorists' skilled and unskilled labor. In addition, a targeted developed
country H launches proactive measures against the terrorist group's
assets,while setting its immigration quotas.5 A second strategic scenario
allows the developed country to deploy target-hardening defensive
measures at home rather than proactive efforts abroad. Our theoretical
construct is descriptive of transnational terrorism in the post-Cold War
era during which terrorist groups take refuge in developing countries,
while attacking host and developed countries' interests.
The developed country's proactive measures abroad provide public
beneﬁts to both countries, while the host country's counterterrorism
against unskilled terrorist labor transfers attacks abroad. The opposite
transference occurs when the host country targets skilled terrorist
labor. As the developed country increases its unskilled labor quota,
terrorist attacks rise there and fall in the country sending the emigrants.
The opposite is true for an increase in the skilled labor quota, so that the
developed country should particularly favor relaxing skilled immigra-
tion quotas from skill-scarce countries where terrorists reside. At ﬁrst,
this seems counterintuitive because terrorist attacks in developed
countries rely on skilled terrorist labor. When, however, the general
equilibrium nature of the two-country framework is laid bare, this
result becomes understandable owing to attack transference between
the countries. With defensive measures replacing proactive measures
in the developed country, the same ﬁnding follows. We also permit
thedeveloped country to assumea leadership position.With leadership,
the developed country augments its proactive efforts, while the host
developing country reduces its proactive efforts against unskilled
labor. Both countries' welfare improves when leadership is compared
to the Nash outcome.
2. The terrorist organization
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by
individuals or subnational groups in order to obtain a political or social5 Our two-country representation applies to a multicountry setting, where a targeted
developed country decides its immigration and proactive countermeasures for a set of de-
veloping countries hosting terrorist groups.objective through intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the
immediate victims. Terrorism is transnational when an incident in one
country involves perpetrators, victims, institutions, or governments of
another country — e.g., 9/11 skyjackings. In recent years, transnational
terrorist groups often locate their base in a developing country from
which they can attack Western interests at home or abroad. Thus,
Yemen, Lebanon, Mali, Somalia, Syria, Pakistan, Morocco, Algeria, and
Afghanistan, have been the base for terrorist groups (Enders and
Sandler, 2012; Mickolus, 2008).
The terrorist organization's payoff function is denoted by
V ¼ ϕH TH þ eTH þ ϕ FT F ; ð1Þ
whereϕ j is the terrorists' preference for attacking nation j (=H, F); TH is
the terrorism damage in developed country H; and TF is the terrorism
damage in developing country F. In Eq. (1), eTH is H's terrorism damage
from an attack in F, so that the developed country's interests can be
hit at home or abroad, which accords with reality — e.g., most attacks
on US interests occur outside the US homeland (Enders and Sandler,
2012). For simplicity, we assume that F has no foreign interests
in H, so that attacks in H are attacks solely against H's assets. As
in Bandyopadhyay et al. (2011), we assume that terror damage for H
in F is
eTH ¼ δHT F ; ð2Þ
where δH is a parameter measuring the extent of H's foreign interests
in F.
TH is produced by using skilled labor St and entrepreneurial capital
KtH of the terrorist leaders. Entrepreneurial capital includes the terrorist
leaders' human capital, infrastructure, network, and ﬁnancial capital,
which are assumed given at a level K . The leaders allocate their capital
betweenattacking thedevelopednation,KtH, and attacking thedevelop-
ing nation, KtF. We assume that a leader has already chosen the life of a
terrorist and remains in the host country. Immigration policies
discussed in this paper do not affect such committed leaders. The only
way to neutralize such resources is directed proactive measures against
such leadership, which is studied below. The production function for
TH is6
TH ¼ TH KtH; St
 
: ð3aÞ
Terrorism directed at F requires unskilled labor Lt and entrepreneurial
capital KtF of the terrorist leaders, such that
T F ¼ T F KtF ; Lt
 
: ð3bÞ
Based on the equations above, the terrorist group's payoff is
V ¼ γHTH þ γ FT F ; γH ¼ ϕH; and γ F ¼ ϕHδH þ ϕ F : ð4Þ
Each unit of unskilled labor has a certain level of radical beliefs,
denoted by θu, so that he or she gets a utility equivalent to θu units of
the numéraire good if he or she succeeds in working for the terrorist
organization. Even though units of unskilled labor are homogeneous
as inputs in terrorism or in producing goods, they differ in their radical6 These are standard constant returns to scale (CRS) production functions with positive
marginal products, (Tji N 0), negative second-order partials (Tiij b 0), and positive cross-
partials (Tixj N 0, i ≠ x). Unless speciﬁed otherwise, we use the standard subscript con-
vention for partial derivatives.
114 S. Bandyopadhyay, T. Sandler / Journal of Public Economics 110 (2014) 112–123beliefs. The distribution of such beliefs is given by the following proba-
bility density and cumulative distribution functions, respectively7:
θu  x θu ; X θ  ¼ ∫θ
−∞
x θu
 
dθu: ð5Þ
All unskilled labor units in F earn wuF from the productive sector,
which equals the marginal product of unskilled labor in producing
goods. When unskilled laborers volunteer for the terrorist organization,
they know that there is a chance that they may not be able to serve
effectively. For example, they may be killed or incarcerated before
being able to take part in an attack. They are assumed to succeed in pro-
viding their services to the terrorist organization with probability βL,
which is a declining function of proactive effortmL undertaken by F to
target unskilled labor resources of the terrorist organization. Assuming
diminishing returns in the use of such offensive action, we have
βL ¼ βL mL
 
; βL
′
mL
 
b 0; and βL
′′
mL
 
N0: ð6Þ
An unskilled laborer stays in the productive sector if his or her wage
exceeds his or her expected marginal return from being a terrorist; that
is,
θuβL mL
 
b wuF⇒θu b
wuF
βL mL
  : ð7Þ
In keeping with the terrorist literature, we assume that the terrorist
group does not pay a wage to its volunteers (e.g., Barrett, 2011;
Sageman, 2004). The fraction of the unskilled labor force that stays in
the productive sector is X w
uF
βL mLð Þ
 
. Let the endowment of the unskilled
labor force in F be given by LF . Also, let α be H's unskilled immigration
quota. Thus, LF−α is the pool of unskilled labor in F, net of emigration
to H. Out of this pool, 1−Xð Þ LF−α
 
laborers volunteer for the terrorist
organization, of which a fraction βL succeeds in providing their services
in terrorist attacks. Accordingly, the unskilled labor pool LT for the
terrorist organization is
LT ¼ βL mL
 
1−X w
uF
βL mL
  !" # LF−α  ¼ LT α;wuF ;mL; LF : ð8Þ
Similarly, let θs, g(θs), and G(θs) be the radicalization parameter, the
probability density function, and the cumulative distribution function
for skilled labor, respectively. Assume that mS is the proactive effort
used by F against the skilled resources of the terrorist organization,
where βS(mS) is the probability that corresponds to Eq. (6). Denoting7 We can address the effects of greater radicalization of a nation's unskilled labor force
within this framework by considering a radicalization parameter σuwhose increase shifts
the entire probability density function to the right, such that there is more probability
mass at higher values of θu. Mathematically, this may be expressed as: θu ∼ x(θu,σu),
and, X θ;σu
  ¼ ∫θ
−∞
x θu;σu
 
dθu , where ∂X θ;σu
 
=∂σu b 0. In other words, at a higher
σu, X θ
 
in Eq. (5) is lower for any θ, implying that a larger fraction of unskilled labor
has higher levels of radical beliefs compared to θ. Similarly, one can analyze greater radi-
calization of the skilled labor force by using a corresponding shift parameter σS. As will be
evident below, σu and σS (the radicalization parameter for skilled labor) affect the supply
of unskilled and skilled labor, respectively, for the terrorist organization. However, we do
not need any restrictions on these parameters or on the shapes of the corresponding prob-
ability density functions, other than that they are consistent with positive labor supplies
for the terrorist organization.the pool of skilled labor in F by S
F
, H's skilled immigration quota by ρ,
and the skilled wage in F by wsF, we have the skilled-labor pool for the
terrorist organization as
ST ¼ βS mS
 
1−G w
sF
βS mS
  !" # SF−ρ  ¼ ST ρ;wsF ;mS; SF : ð9Þ
The terrorist leaders live in a safe zone (say the North-West Frontier
Province of Pakistan) from attacks by F, but are subject to attacks by H
(say through covert operations like the drone attacks). Let mK denote
the proactive effort expended by H. Then, assuming that βK(mK) is
similar to the other β functions described above, we have
KtH þ KtF ¼ βK mK
 
K: ð10Þ
The terrorist organization maximizes its utility, given its supply of
skilled and unskilled labor, and the ﬁxed supply of entrepreneurial
capitalK. Eqs. (8) and (9) show that the supplies of skilled and unskilled
labor are given to the terrorist organization; thus, its only choice is to
allocate its capital optimally between the two types of terrorism. This
problem is represented by
Max V ¼ γHTH KtH; ST
 
þ γ FT F KtF ; LT
 
þ λ βK mK
 
K−KtH−KtF
h i
;
ð11Þ
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the capital con-
straint. The ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs) are Eq. (10) and
γHTH1 K
tH
; ST
 
¼ λ ¼ γ FT F1 KtF ; LT
 
: ð12Þ
Suppressing γH and γF, wage rates, and factor endowments, we have
that Eqs. (10) and (12) yield:
Ktj ¼ Ktj mK ; ST ρ;mS
 
; LT α;mL
 h i
¼ Ktj mK ;mS;mL;α;ρ
 
; j ¼ H; F:
ð13Þ
Thus, terrorism against H and F can be expressed as
TH ¼ TH KtH mK ;mS;mL;α;ρ
 
; ST ρ;mS
 h i
¼ TH mK ;mS;mL;α;ρ
 
; ð14aÞ
T F ¼ T F KtF mK ;mS;mL;α;ρ
 
; LT α;mL
 h i
¼ T F mK ;mS;mL;α;ρ
 
: ð14bÞ
This model will result in a couple of propositions, beginning with
Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. In the proactive game, developed countryH's attacks on
terrorist leaders reduce terrorist attacks everywhere; however, host
country F 's countermeasures against unskilled terrorists curtail terrorist
attacks in F but increases them in H. Productive activities in F increase.
When, however, country F targets skilled labor, terrorist attacks in F
go up, while those in the developed country H go down.
Directed attacks against the terrorist leaders reduce the capital that
is used for attacks in both H and F. However, F 's countermeasures
against unskilled terrorists make attacks in F less feasible, leading to a
shift of capital to attacks against H. The reverse mechanism holds for
F 's countermeasures against skilled terrorists. This proactive proposi-
tion is novel to the counterterrorism literature (e.g., Sandler and
Siqueira, 2006), because the proposition identiﬁes that some proactive
measures can lead to attack transference, previously associated with
defensive measures. The formal development of Proposition 1 follows.
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∂KtH
∂mK
¼ γ FT F11KβK
′
=D b 0; where D ¼ γHTH11 þ γ FT F11 b 0; and ð15aÞ
∂KtF
∂mK
¼ γHTH11KβK
′
=D b 0: ð15bÞ
Thus, proactive effort by H that targets the terrorist leaders reduces the
total stock of entrepreneurial capital that they have, and, in turn, the
capital that these leaders employ for terrorism against both H and F.
The negative effects on terrorism are given by
∂TH
∂mK
¼ TH1
∂KtH
∂mK
b 0 and ð16aÞ
∂T F
∂mK
¼ T F1
∂KtF
∂mK
b 0: ð16bÞ
Thus, proactive efforts byHmust reduce terrorism against bothH and F,
thereby conveying a positive public good externality to F. We can also
show that
∂KtH
∂mL
¼ γ FT F12
∂LT
∂mL
 !
=D N 0;
where
∂LT
∂mL
¼ 1−X þ xw
uF
βL
 !
LF−α
 
βL
′
b 0; and
ð17aÞ
∂KtF
∂mL
¼−∂K
tH
∂mL
b 0: ð17bÞ
When F engages in targeted proactive measures against unskilled
labor volunteering for the terrorist organization, the unskilled labor
resources of the terrorist organization (i.e., LT) must decline for two
reasons. First, for a given allocation of the unskilled labor force between
the productive and the terrorist sectors, the terrorists' unskilled labor
supply falls as unskilled volunteers are reduced. Second, perceiving a
greater probability of being eliminated, some of the potential terrorist
volunteers turn to the productive sector. This reduces the allocation of
unskilled labor resources for the terrorist organization leading to its
scaling back of terrorist attacks in F. The terrorist capital that is released
from F (Eq. (17b)) is now engaged in H (Eq. (17a)), where terrorist
attacks rise. Thus, F's proactive stance against unskilled terrorist
resources inﬂicts a negative externality on H. Formally, the effects on
terrorism are
∂TH
∂mL
¼ TH1
∂KtH
∂mL
N 0 and ð18aÞ
∂T F
∂mL
¼ T F1
∂KtF
∂mL
þ T F2
∂LT
∂mL
b 0: ð18bÞ
When F targets skilled labor resources, the effects are exactly the
opposite of the previous case, and, therefore, are not repeated here. As
skilled resources decline, the terrorists increase attacks against F and
reduce them against H, conferring a positive externality on H. It is
reasonable to question why F may engage in a proactive policy that
raises terrorism against itself, but this is clariﬁed in Section 3. We now
turn to the inﬂuence of immigration quotas as a counterterrorism tool,
captured in Proposition 2.8 We assume that emigration is neutral in terms of affecting the probability distribu-
tions of radicalization in F 's population of skilled and unskilled labor. Thus, a reduction
of the unskilled (skilled) labor pool through emigration does not affect the fraction X (G).Proposition 2. An increase in the unskilled (skilled) labor quota raises
(lowers) terrorist attacks in the country receiving the emigrants and
lowers (raises) these attacks in the country sending the emigrants.
Thus, lowering (raising) the quota for unskilled (skilled) labor isbeneﬁcial to the receiving country, provided that its interests are not
too great in the host country.
Whenmore skilled immigrants are allowed intoH, the pool of skilled
resources available to the terrorist organization in F is smaller, so that
terrorists scale back attacks on H. More of the terrorists' capital is
reallocated to F, where terrorism rises. This terrorism-reducing effect
of skilled immigration on the developed nation H is a novel result
in the immigration literature. Turning to unskilled immigration, the
opposite line of reasoning applies. Accounting for such beneﬁts or
costs justiﬁes a more liberal immigration policy for the skilled, while it
suggests a more restrictive stance for unskilled immigration. This is
especially relevant to immigration from nations that host terrorist
groups — e.g., Pakistan, Yemen, Mali, and Somalia. The formal develop-
ment of Proposition 2 depends on the following comparative statics:
∂KtH
∂α ¼ γ
FT F12
∂LT
∂α
 !
=D N 0;where
∂LT
∂α ¼−β
L 1−Xð Þ b 0 ; and ð19aÞ
∂KtF
∂α ¼−
∂KtH
∂α b 0: ð19bÞ
∂TH
∂α ¼ T
H
1
∂KtH
∂α N 0 and ð20aÞ
∂T F
∂α ¼ T
F
1
∂KtF
∂α þ T
F
2
∂LT
∂α b 0: ð20bÞ
The analysis of a relaxation in the skilled immigration quota is precisely
the opposite of that for unskilled immigration, and hence is not repeated
here.
Table 1 summarizes the direction of the comparative statics of
Propositions 1 and 2. It also presents the effects of the different counter-
terrorism policies and immigration quotas on the terrorists' capital
allocation.
3. Utility-maximizing proactive policies: effects of immigration
quotas
3.1. The developing country's government's choices
We assume that F produces two goods Q1F and Q2F using standard
CRS production functions,
QjF ¼ η jF LjF ; SjF
 
; j ¼ 1;2; ð21Þ
where LjF and SjF are unskilled and skilled labor used in the production of
goods 1 and 2 in F. Since X and G are the shares of unskilled and skilled
labor, respectively, engaged in productive activity in F, we have8
LF ¼ LF−α
 
X and SF ¼ SF−ρ
 
G: ð22Þ
The resource constraints for the productive sectors are
L1F þ L2F ¼ LF and S1 F þ S2F ¼ SF : ð23Þ
Goods 1 and 2 are produced in competitive markets characterized by
zero proﬁts. The output prices of the two goods are p1 and p2. Let
Table 1
Comparative statics summarizing Propositions 1 and 2.
KtH KtF TH TF
mK – – – –
mL + – + –
mS – + – +
α + – + –
ρ – + – +
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functions. The zero-proﬁt conditions are
p1 ¼ C1F wuF ;wsF
 
and p2 ¼ C2 F wuF ;wsF
 
: ð24aÞ
Eq. (24a) implies that
wuF ¼ wuF p1; p2
 
and wsF ¼ wsF p1;p2
 
: ð24bÞ
For a small open economy, (p1, p2) is given, so that Eq. (24b) implies that
the factor prices wuF and wsF are given, independent of factor
endowments.9
Using standard trade models (Dixit and Norman, 1980), we can write
F 's GDP function as a revenue function,RF p1; p2; L
F−α
 
X; S
F−ρ
 
G
h i
,
and its consumption expenditure as the expenditure function,
eF(p1, p2, uF), where uF is F 's utility level. Trade balance requires
that F 's expenditure must equal the sum of its GDP and immigrant
earnings from abroad, net of terrorism-related damage, and net of
F's costs of proactive efforts. This condition is
eF p1;p2;uF
 
¼ RF p1;p2; LF−α
 
X; SF−ρ
 
G
h i
þwuHα þwsHρ−T F−mL−mS;
ð25aÞ
where emigrants' earnings from H are wuHα + wsHρ, and the
terror-related costs are TF, mL, and mS. The unit price of proactive
measures is 1. Eq. (25a) implicitly deﬁnes F's utility as
uF ¼ uF mL;mS;α;ρ;mK
 
: ð25bÞ
This model allows us to relate counterterrorism and the productive
sector:
Proposition 3. Host country F 's proactive measures against unskilled
labor have the twin beneﬁts of reducing terrorism in F and expanding
F 's productive labor force. When, however, country F targets skilled
labor, terrorism in F rises, offsetting the gains obtained from an expan-
sion of productive resources. If and only if the latter effect dominates,
Fwill target skilled labor even when it raises terrorism.
When F targets unskilled terrorists, their labor pool declines, reduc-
ing terrorism in F. As more of F's unskilled laborers choose the produc-
tive sector, there is an additional beneﬁt from increased output. When
skilled terrorists are targeted, attacks against H are reduced, leading to
a reallocation of capital for more attacks against F. There is also a
countervailing beneﬁt from more skilled labor in the productive sector.9 We assume that both the developed nation H and the developing nation F are small in
the world goods market. This ﬁxes factor prices in both nations and lends tractability. A
large-country analysis would require an international market-clearing equation. The sim-
plest of general equilibrium trademodels that analyze transfers, migration, or trade policy
can quickly get complicated in the large-country case. Providing such an analysis, within
the present context of a multistage game with several players, is beyond the scope of
the current paper.Only if the latter effect dominates, F chooses more proactive measures
against skilled terrorists. The formal development of Proposition 3
follows.
Country F chooses its utility-maximizing proactive policies mL and
mS, taking the immigration quotas and H's proactive level mK as given.
After normalizing the marginal utility of income to unity (i.e., euF = 1),
we can express the respective FOCs (see Appendix A) as
∂uF
∂mL
¼−
wuF
 2
x LF−α
 
βL
′
βL
 2 −∂T F∂mL−1≤0 and ð26aÞ
∂uF
∂mS
¼−
wsF
 2
g SF−ρ
 
βS
′
βS
 2 −∂T F∂mS−1≤0: ð26bÞ
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side (RHS) of Eq. (26a) is positive,
reﬂecting the rise in utility when unskilled potential terrorists choose
to stay in the productive sector when dissuaded by greater counterter-
rorism. This beneﬁt comes out of the occupational choice problem,
described in Section 2. The second term is also positive, because the
direct effect of proactive effort against unskilled terrorists is to reduce
terrorism in host country F (i.e., ∂T
F
∂mL b 0). The last term on the RHS of
Eq. (26a) preceding the inequality sign is themarginal costs of proactive
efforts, which is constant at unity. At an interior solution (mL N 0), the
marginal beneﬁts from proactive mL are equated to its marginal costs.
The interpretation of Eq. (26b) is similar except that, rather than confer-
ring beneﬁts, mS imposes costs on F in terms of more terrorism (recall
Proposition 1). However, F may still use mS as a policy tool as long as
the deterrence effect, which keeps more skilled labor in the productive
sector, is large. This ﬁnding provides a rationale for a nation, such as
Pakistan or Yemen, to engage in counterterrorism policies even in
situations where such policies against skilled operatives may raise
terrorism. Following al-Qaida's suicide terrorist attacks on Western
residential compounds and other attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure
during 2003–2005, Saudi Arabia took a ﬁrm proactive stance against
terrorism to preserve its income, even though the stance initially
resulted in more terrorist attacks (Economist.com, 2008). This com-
pletes the discussion of Proposition 3, and we turn to a description of
F 's policy reaction function.
Henceforth, to keep the analysis simple, we focus on the corner
solution (mS = 0) that arise from Eq. (26b) for a sufﬁciently small occu-
pational choice effect. The latter effect is scaled by S
F−ρ
 
, which is the
net skilled labor pool in the developing nation. It is reasonable to
assume that this pool is sufﬁciently small in many developing nations
hosting terrorist groups (see Section 4), so that the occupational choice
effect is dominated by the other considerations. In this case, Eq. (26a)
implicitly deﬁnes F 's utility-maximizing proactive level as
mL ¼ mL mK ;α;ρ
 
: ð27aÞ
Eq. (27a) is F 's Nash reaction function in (mL, mK) space, where mK is
chosen simultaneously byH. Using Eq. (26a) above, we can show that10
∂mL
∂mK
b 0;
∂mL
∂α N0 if L
F−α is sufficiently large and ∂m
L
∂ρ N0; ð27bÞ
implying that F views mK as a strategic substitute formL.10 The derivation is in the Appendix A. A similar methodology is applied to derive and
sign the various partial derivatives of the reaction functions in the rest of the paper.
Fig. 1. Nash equilibriums before and after a rise in α.
11 From this point onward, we only present the results pertaining to the comparative
statics for H. The analysis for F can be pursued along similar lines, and is available from
the authors on request. Because ourmain objective is to throw light on immigration policy,
which is the purview of H, our focus is justiﬁed.
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Developed nation H is assumed to have a similar production sector
as nation F. The trade balance equation is
eH p1; p2;uH
 
¼ RH p1; p2; LH þ α; SH þ ρ
h i
−wuHα−wsHρ−TH−δHT F−mK ; ð28aÞ
analogous to Eq. (25a). Eq. (28a) implicitly deﬁnesH's utility function as
uH ¼ uH mK ;α;ρ;mL
 
: ð28bÞ
H takesmL, α, and ρ as given when it choosesmK to maximize its utility.
The FOC is
−TH1
∂KtH
∂mK
−δHT F1
∂KtF
∂mK
¼ 1: ð29Þ
The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side (LHS) of Eq. (29) measures the
terror-reduction gains in H, while the second term reﬂects the gain for
H from a reduction of terror that impacts its foreign interests in F. At
the optimum, these marginal beneﬁts are equated to H's marginal
costs of proaction, which is unity. Eq. (29) implicitly deﬁnes H's Nash
reaction function formK as:
mK ¼ mK mL;α;ρ
 
: ð30aÞ
Analyzing Eq. (29), we can show that
∂mK
∂mL
b 0;
∂mK
∂α b 0; and
∂mK
∂ρ b 0; ð30bÞ
thereby implying that H viewsmL as a strategic substitute for mK.
3.3. The Nash equilibrium of the proactive game and comparative statics
Eqs. (27a) and (30a) jointly determine the Nash equilibrium levels
of proactive efforts in the two nations as mLN(α, ρ) and mKN(α, ρ). Let
rH and rF denote the slope of the Nash reaction functions of H and F,
respectively. Then, stability of the Nash equilibrium requires that
rHrF b 1. Using Eqs. (27a) through (30b), we can derive (available
upon request) that
dmL
dα
¼
r F
∂mK
∂α þ
∂mL
∂α
1−rHr F
N0;
dmL
dρ
¼
r F
∂mK
∂ρ þ
∂mL
∂ρ
1−rHr F
N0; ð31aÞ
dmK
dα
¼
rH
∂mL
∂α þ
∂mK
∂α
1−rHr F
b 0; and
dmK
dρ
¼
rH
∂mL
∂ρ þ
∂mK
∂ρ
1−rHr F
b 0: ð31bÞ
The comparative statics presented in Eqs. (31a) and (31b) are
represented in Fig. 1. A rise in the unskilled immigration quota αmust
augment F 's proactive measures mL, while it must reduce mK in H.
Greater emigration of unskilled labor depletes the unskilled labor pool
of the terrorists, thus raising the productivity of the remaining unskilled
labor pool through diminishing returns. The marginal gain from proac-
tive efforts against a more productive pool is higher, thus mL tends to
rise for a given mK, shifting F's reaction function from mL to mL′ in
Fig. 1. As unskilled terrorist labor in F is depleted by emigration, the
terrorists shift more of their capital toward H. While this raises attacks
against H, the capital deepening also reduces the marginal productivity
of terrorists' capital employed against H. At the margin, this reduces H's
incentive to target the terrorists' capital, and hence mK tends to fall,shifting H's reaction function down frommK tomK′ in Fig. 1. These shifts
cause the Nash equilibrium to shift from Equilibrium 1 to Equilibrium 2,
where mK must fall and mL must rise in response to a relaxation of the
unskilled immigration quota.
It is somewhat surprising that the relaxation of the skilled immigra-
tion quota (i.e., a rise in ρ) has qualitatively similar effects as the
relaxation of the unskilled immigration quota. This follows because
emigration of skilled labor from F depletes the terrorists' skilled labor
pool. The terrorists reorient their attacks on F and, in the process, shift
more of their capital to such activity. As a result themarginal productiv-
ity of unskilled labor in creating terror in F rises, thereby increasing F 's
incentive to use mL. Moreover, because the terrorists' skilled labor
pool is depleted by skilled emigration, the marginal product of terror-
ists' capital, used against H, must fall. This then reduces H's incentive
to target this capital, so that mK falls. The underlying model will lead,
as shown below, to the following proposition:
Proposition 4. A relaxation of the unskilled immigration quota by
country H increases terrorism at home and reduces H's welfare in the
absence of its foreign interests. A relaxation of the skilled immigration
quota reduces terrorism in H and raises H's utility as long as
immigration's direct effects outweigh the induced effects working
through proactive measures.
WhenH relaxes its unskilled immigration quota, terrorism against H
rises at given counterterrorism levels (Proposition 2). In addition, mK
falls and mL rises, further increasing terrorism in H (Proposition 1).
The direct effect of a relaxation of the skilled immigration quota is a
reduction of terrorism in H (Proposition 2); but the induced changes
in counterterrorism efforts pull in a different direction. As long as the
direct effect dominates, skilled immigration reduces terror in H. The
formal development of Proposition 4 follows.11
dTH
dα
¼ TH1
dKtH
dα
N0;
dKtH
dα
¼
γ F T F12
∂LT
∂α þ T
F
11Kβ
K ′ dm
K
dα
þ T F12
∂LT
∂mL
dmL
dα
 !
D
N0;
ð32aÞ
12 Another advantage of this elasticity is that it is independent of the allocation of skilled
labor between the productive and the terrorist sectors. All that we need is the total pool of
skilled labor of nation F and the immigration quota that nationH imposes on skilled immi-
gration from nation F.
118 S. Bandyopadhyay, T. Sandler / Journal of Public Economics 110 (2014) 112–123and
dTH
dρ
¼ TH1
∂KtH
∂mK
dmK
dρ
þ ∂K
tH
∂mL
dmL
dρ
 !
þ TH1
∂KtH
∂ρ þ T
H
2
∂ST
∂ρ : ð32bÞ
The sign of Eq. (32a) follows from Eqs. (17a), (19a), (31a), and
(31b). Eq. (32b), however, presents some ambiguities with respect to
the skilled labor quota. The direct effect of ρ on terrorism, discussed in
Section 2, indicates that a relaxation of the skilled immigration quota
reduces terrorism against H for given proactive levels. This is captured
by the last two RHS terms of Eq. (32b). However, a relaxation of the
skilled immigration quota raises mL and reduces mK. Both of these
indirect effects increase the terrorists' capital directed at H, and tend
to raise terrorism against H. When the direct effects dominate, TH
must fall as more skilled labor is allowed into H.
Using Eq. (28b) and the envelope theorem, ignoring H's foreign
interests (i.e., δH = 0), and normalizing H's marginal utility of income
to unity (euH = 1), we get
duH
dα
¼ ∂u
H
∂α þ
∂uH
∂mL
dmL
dα
b 0;where
∂uH
∂α ¼−
∂TH
∂α b 0 and
∂uH
∂mL
¼−∂T
H
∂mL
b 0: ð33Þ
Eq. (33) shows that a rise in the unskilled immigration quota must re-
duce H's utility in the absence of any foreign interests. This follows
from three effects. First, we established earlier that a rise in the unskilled
quota increases terrorism againstH for given proactive levels. Second, as
α changes, H's proactive measures change too, but, by the envelope
theorem, the effect of that change on H's utility is zero. Third, as α and
mL rise, Section 2 indicates that there is an increase in terrorism against
H. In summary, these effects contribute to a net rise in terrorism against
H, thereby reducing H's utility.
The effect of skilled immigration may be obtained as
duH
dρ
¼ ∂u
H
∂ρ þ
∂uH
∂mL
dmL
dρ
;where
∂uH
∂ρ ¼−
∂TH
∂ρ N0: ð34Þ
The ﬁrst term on the RHS of Eq. (34) reﬂects the utility gains from the
direct terror-reducing effects of skilled immigration. The second RHS
term, however, reﬂects utility losses arising out of increased terrorism
in H induced by higher proactive efforts by F asmL rises in response to
higher emigration, thereby causing negative terrorism externalities for
H. If the direct effect dominates the effect of terrorism spillovers, H's
utility will rise.
4. Country case studies: immigration elasticity of the supply of
skilled labor for terror
This section discusses the potential magnitudes of the effects that
skilled immigration quotas may have on transnational terrorism origi-
nating from small skill-scarce nations. Consider the case where mS is
zero, such that βS is unity. Using Eqs. (9) and (24b), we have
ηS ¼−d lnS
T
d lnρ
¼ ρ
SF−ρ
; ð9′Þ
where ηS is the elasticity of skilled labor supply for the terrorist sector
with respect to the skilled immigrationquota. This terror-supply elastic-
ity is a goodmeasure of the effectiveness of skilled immigration quota in
containing terrorism in H for the following reasons. First, when ρ is
raised, the elasticity measures the shrinkage of the terrorist
organization's skilled labor pool, critical for creating terrorism in H. Sec-
ond, a rise in ρ also reduces the complementary factor, KtH, further re-
ducing TH. Thus, ηS is a lower bound for measuring the effectiveness ofthe quota in reducing TH.12 Next, we consider two potential source na-
tions of terrorism that are both small and skill-scarce, and provide a dis-
cussion of elasticity ηS in their respective contexts.
From Barro and Lee (2000), we have data on educational attainment
of different nations. Mali's 15 years and older population was
6.626 million in 2000, the latest available year. The percentage that
completed secondary education (high school) or beyond was 0.7%,
and the percentage that completed post-secondary education (college
or beyond) was 0.3%. Assuming that secondary level education is
required to be skilled, Mali's skilled population in 2000 was 46,382
(i.e., 0.7% of 6.626 million). From the World Bank (2013), we get
Mali's labor force participation rate for the same population as 51.2%
in 2000. This participation rate yields a skilled labor force for Mali of
approximately 23,748. From Eq. (9′), we ﬁnd that ηS equals unity
when ρ is one-half of nation F 's skilled labor force, and that ηSmonoton-
ically rises above that level. This suggests that Mali's terror supply is
elastic for a skilled immigration quota exceeding 11,874. Such an immi-
gration quota, which can make a signiﬁcant dent on Mali-generated
transnational terrorism, is entirely within the absorptive capacity of
many targeted nations. We caution not to take these numbers literally,
because, for tractability, we had to abstract from a number of factors
that may affect the actual terror-supply elasticity. Nevertheless, the
numbers indicate that skilled immigration quotas may potentially
have large effects on transnational terrorism originating from a skill-
scarce nation.
Unfortunately, we do not have information on Somalia from Barro
and Lee (2000). Using the World Bank indicators, we ﬁnd that
Somalia's total labor force was around 2.22 million in 2000. Assuming
that Somalia's skilled labor force as a percentage of its total labor force
is comparable to Mali's at 0.7%, Somalia's skilled labor force is around
15,540, so that a skilled immigration quota of around 8000 yields an
elastic terror-supply response.
In contrast to the nations studied above, calculations based on the
Barro and Lee (2000) dataset show that for a large nation like India,
an elastic terror-supply requires a skilled immigration quota of around
13 million. Clearly, this is not a feasible policy instrument for an
individual developed nation. For a populous developing nation like
India, S
F
dwarfs any reasonable value of the skilled immigration quota
that H may use. In such a case, ηS is small, and a quota is unlikely to
makemuch of a dent on terrorism. However, many of the smaller failed
states like Somalia, Yemen, and Mali have been crucial safe havens for
transnational terrorism. Immigration policy in these cases can comple-
ment other counterterrorism policies.
5. The Stackelberg outcome where H is the leader
By virtue of their asymmetric power in world security, developed
nations are often viewed as leaders in the ﬁght against terrorism.
Keeping that asymmetry in mind, we consider how a leadership role
for H may inﬂuence the nature of the proactive game. As a leader, H
assumes that F chooses its proactive response by using the reaction
function deﬁned in Eq. (27a). The analysis of leadership will result in
the following proposition:
Proposition 5. If developed country H assumes a leadership role, it
raises its proactive measures relative to the Nash equilibrium outcome
if and only if its foreign interests are sufﬁciently small. Host nation F
will reduce its proactive efforts if and only ifH raises its proactive efforts.
In the absence of H's foreign interests, both nations' welfare levels are
higher at the leadership outcome relative to the Nash equilibrium.
Fig. 2. Stackelberg versus Nash equilibriums.
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may be either larger or smaller.
Given thatmL raises terrorism in H's homeland (Proposition 1), it is
in H's interest to see mL reduced. Given Eq. (27b), H beneﬁts from
choosing a highermK compared toNash, such that F follows by choosing
a lowermL. The public good beneﬁts of greater proactivemeasures byH
more than compensate F for the reduction of its own measures. The
formal development of Proposition 5 now follows.
Using Eqs. (27a) and (28b), we get
duH
dmK
¼ ∂u
H
∂mK
þ ∂u
H
∂mL
 !
dmL
dmK
 !
: ð35aÞ
Evaluating the above derivative at the Nash equilibrium, we can set the
ﬁrst term on the RHS of Eq. (35a) to zero. Because F 's reaction function
is downward sloping, we have that
duH
dmK jNash
¼ ∂u
H
∂mL
 !
dmL
dmK
 !
jNash
N 0 ;
if and only if
∂uH
∂mL
¼−∂T
H
∂mL
−δH ∂T
F
∂mL
b 0:
ð35bÞ
From Eqs. (18a) and (18b), ∂T
H
∂mL is positive, while
∂T F
∂mL is negative.
Thus, if H's foreign interests in F are sufﬁciently small (i.e., δH is zero or
small), ∂u
H
∂mL is negative. In this event,
duH
dmK Nashj is positive, implying that
as a leader Hwill raisemK above the Nash level. Given that F 's reaction
function is negatively sloped, F reduces mL relative to Nash. These
ﬁndings seem to accord with what we see in Afghanistan or Pakistan,
where the US economic interests are less pervasive, and the United
States takes a more aggressive proactive role. In contrast, given that
the United States is heavily dependent on Saudi or Algerian oil, the US
policy for these nations has been to take a relatively passive counterter-
rorism stance, allowing these governments to be proactive —
e.g., Algeria's response in 2013 to terrorists' takeover of a gas facility in
the desert.
We now turn to a comparison of H's and F 's welfare and terrorism
levels between the Nash and the leadership outcomes. For the remain-
der of this section, we assume that H has no foreign interests in F,
which implies that mK must be higher at the leadership outcome.13
When the leader chooses a highermK, it must raise the leader's welfare
compared to Nash, since the leader always has the option of the Nash
equilibrium. In Fig. 2, the follower's iso-utility curves must achieve
higher values as one goes northwest. This follows because, for a given
mL, a higher mK must raise F's utility by reducing TF [see Eq. (25a)].
R denotes the leadership outcome and is northwest of the Nash
equilibrium, N. This leader–follower equilibrium corresponds to a
tangency between one of H's iso-utility curves (not displayed) and
F 's reaction path. Consequently, F 's utility at R must exceed its utility
at N.14
The movement from N to R constitutes a Pareto improvement,
where both nations gain. This follows because mK is purely public and
underprovided at N. In going from N to R, the provision of the public
good and thus efﬁciency increase. In addition, mK substitutes for mL,
where the latter is overprovided in the Nash equilibrium, in the sense
that mL confers negative terrorism externalities to H. This substitution
effect also helps in alleviating the Nash inefﬁciencies. Finally, turning13 This assumption helps in reducing the taxonomy of cases.
14 A graphical approach provides an easier comparison because themovement fromN to
R is a discrete move.to the effect on terrorism in H, and recalling Eqs. (3a), (9), (15a),
(17a), and (27b), we get
dTH
dmK
¼ TH1
∂KtH
∂mK
þ ∂K
tH
∂mL
 !
dmL
dmK
 !" #
b 0: ð36Þ
Since this derivative is globally negative along F 's reaction function, we
may infer that at R, which is associated with a higher mK, TH must be
lower than atN. The comparison of terrorism in F between the two out-
comes is less clear, because there are opposing effects from a rise inmK
and a fall in mL.15
6. The defense-proactive game
Counterterrorism tools may be proactive or defensive. Proactive
measures confront the terrorists, their supporters, and their assets
directly, while defensive actions usually involve hardening potential
targets. Up until now, we allowed both countries to engage in proactive
responses. In this section and the next, the developed country H uses
only defensive measures, while the developing country F applies proac-
tive measures to its resident terrorists. Here, we present H's optimal
choice of defensive efforts. The sole change to the model is that H
chooses defense aH rather than proactive mK as a counterterrorism
tool. Greater defensive effort reduces the probability θ of a successful
attack on H:
θ ¼ θ aH
 
;where θ′ aH
 
b 0 and θ″ aH
 
N 0 ð37Þ
so that defense reduces this probability but at a diminishing rate.
The terrorist group's payoff function, previously described as Eq. (1),
is now
V ¼ ϕH θ aH
 
TH þ eTHh iþ ϕ FT F ; ð38Þ15 We should note that terrorism and utility do not necessarily move together for F, be-
cause containing terrorism entails costs. Therefore, we cannot infer that F 's terrorism is
lower at R compared to N in Fig. 2.
17 We assume that there is always a minimumpositive probability of attack inH regard-
H H
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in H. Using Eqs. (2) through (3b), we can reduce Eq. (38) to
V ¼ γH aH
 
TH þ γ FT F ;where γH aH
 
≡ ϕHθ aH
 
and
γ F ¼ ϕHδH þ ϕ F :
ð39Þ
In the absence of H's proactive efforts, Eq. (10) is replaced by
KtH þ KtF ¼ K: ð40Þ
The remainder of the model structure in Section 2 is unchanged.
Once again, we drop proactive measures against skilled labor mS,
because we consider the corner solution where mS = 0. Using
Eq. (40) and recalling Eqs. (8) and (9), we have the following capital
allocation equation:
γH aH
 
TH1 K
tH
; ST ρð Þ
h i
¼ γ FT F1 K−KtH; LT α;mL
 h i
; ð41aÞ
which implicitly deﬁnes
KtH ¼ KtH α;ρ; aH;mL
 
and
KtF ¼ K−KtH α;ρ; aH;mL
 
¼ KtF α;ρ; aH;mL
 
:
ð41bÞ
Given Eqs. (41b), (3a), and (3b), we have that terrorism damage in H
and F is
TH ¼ TH KtH ð Þ; ST ρð Þ
h i
and T F ¼ T F KtF ð Þ; LT α;mL
 h i
: ð41cÞ
6.1. The developing country's government
Host nation F's proactive choice problem is identical to that
described in Section 3, except that mK in Eq. (25b) is replaced by aH to
give F's utility as
uF ¼ uF mL;α;ρ; aH
 
: ð42aÞ
The counterpart of Eq. (27a) for the defense-proactive model is the fol-
lowing Nash reaction function for nation F:
mL ¼ mL aH;α;ρ
 
: ð42bÞ
The effect of the immigration quotas on mL must be the same as
described in Eq. (27b), but the effect of aH on mL is different. We can
show that
∂mL
∂aH
N 0; ð42cÞ
implying that F viewsH's defense as a strategic complement. As nationH
raises its defense, more terrorist capital ﬂows into attacks on F. This
raises the productivity of the terrorists' unskilled resources, so that F
has greater incentive to target these resources, thereby raisingmL.
6.2. The developed country's government
For brevity, we consider the case where developed country H has no
foreign interests (i.e., δH = 0).16 The trade balance equation is now
eH p1; p2;uH
 
¼ RH p1;p2; LH þ α; SH þ ρ
h i
−wuHα−wsHρ−θ aH
 
TH−aH; ð43aÞ16 The results for the case where δH N 0 are available from the authors on request.which implicitly deﬁnes H's welfare as
uH ¼ uH aH;α;ρ;mL
 
: ð43bÞ
Developed country H's FOC for its choice of aH is
−THθ′ aH
 
−θ aH
  ∂TH
∂aH
¼ 1: ð44Þ
The ﬁrst term on the LHS of Eq. (44) measures the terrorism-reducing
gains from defense due to the smaller probability of attack success.
The second LHS term reﬂects reduced terrorism in H due to the deter-
rence effect. When H becomes a harder target to hit, the terrorist
organization shifts some of its capital from H toward its resident
country F. These marginal beneﬁts are equated at the optimum to H's
marginal costs of defense, which is unity. Eq. (44) implicitly deﬁnes
H's Nash reaction function for the choice of aH as
aH ¼ aH mL;α;ρ
 
: ð45aÞ
Analyzing Eq. (44), we can show that
∂aH
∂mL
b 0 and
∂aH
∂α b 0; if
γH
γ F
N
T F11
TH11
N0 and
∂aH
∂ρ b 0: ð45bÞ
The inequality, γ
H
γ F
N T
F
11
TH11
N0, is likely to be satisﬁed when H is a prime-
target nation for the terrorists.17
6.3. The Nash equilibrium of the defense-proactive game and the
comparative statics
Eqs. (42b) and (45a) jointly determine this game's Nash equilibrium
outcomes as aHeN α;ρð Þ and mLeN α;ρð Þ. Let erH and er F denote the slope of
the Nash reaction functions of H and F, respectively. Using the stability
of the Nash equilibrium (erHer Fb1) and Eqs. (42a) through (45b), we
can derive that
dmL
dα
¼
er F ∂aH∂α þ ∂m
L
∂α
1−erHer F N0 ; if and only if ∂m
L
∂α N
er F ∂aH∂α

; and
dmL
dρ
¼
er F ∂aH∂ρ þ ∂m
L
∂ρ
1−erHer F N0 ; if and only if ∂m
L
∂ρ N
er F ∂aH∂ρ

: ð46aÞ
daH
dα
¼
∂aH
∂α þerH ∂m
L
∂α
1−erHer F b 0; and da
H
dρ
¼
∂aH
∂ρ þerH ∂m
L
∂ρ
1−erHer F b 0: ð46bÞ
The comparative statics presented in Eqs. (46a) and (46b) are
presented in Fig. 3. Equilibrium 1 is the original Nash equilibrium
where F 's positively sloped mL reaction path intersects H's negatively
sloped aH reaction path. Equilibrium 2 corresponds to a rise in H's
unskilled labor quota, which may cause a large rightward shift in mL
tomL′, accompanied by a leftward shift in aH to aH′. As shown in Fig. 3,
this results in a fall in aH from aH1 to aH2, and a rise in mL1 to mL2. If,
however, the shift in mL is relatively small (i.e., mL′′), then we have
Equilibrium3where aH still falls butmL also falls. For nation F's proactive
choice, there are two opposing effects. First, greater emigration of
unskilled labor tends to incentivize a greater proactive response by F,less of the amount of defensive effort. In this case, for a sufﬁciently high ϕ , γ is high
enough to satisfy the inequality.
Fig. 3. Nash equilibriums in defense-proactive game with a rise in α (ρ).
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second effect arises out of F 's reaction to changes in H's defense choice.
Emigration of unskilled labor reduces productivity of terrorist capital in
attacking H, leading to a lowering of defense by H. Given strategic com-
plementarity described in Eq. (42b), F responds by lowering its proac-
tive measures. When the ﬁrst effect dominates, we get Equilibrium 2,
otherwise, we get Equilibrium 3. The response to skilled immigration
quota can be explained by considering the above arguments and
recalling the corresponding discussion from Section 3.
Proposition 6. Terrorism and utility effects of skilled and unskilled
immigration quotas are robust to a change in the nature of the game
from purely proactive to the defense-proactive scenario. In both
games, unskilled immigration increases terrorism at home and reduces
H's welfare if H's foreign interests are limited. Skilled immigration
reduces terrorism in H and raises H's utility as long as the quota's direct
effects outweigh the induced effects working through the proactive
measures.
Using Propositions 1 and 2, we can infer that a rise in unskilled
immigration and the induced rise in F's proactive response will raise
terrorism against H. In addition, the induced fall in H's defense also
raises terrorism against H. Using Proposition 2, we infer that as long as
the direct effect of the skilled immigration quota dominates the induced
counterterrorism effects, terrorism against H is reduced by relaxing the
skilled immigration quota. The formal development of Proposition 6
follows.
Using Eq. (41a), we have that ∂K
tH
∂α N0,
∂KtH
∂mL N0, and
∂KtH
∂aH b 0. Also, we
have dS
T
dρ b 0 fromEq. (9). From Eq. (46b), we know that
daH
dα b 0. Keeping
these derivatives in mind and assuming that dmLdα N0, we get
dTH
dα
¼ TH1
dKtH
dα
N0;because
dKtH
dα
¼ ∂K
tH
∂α þ
∂KtH
∂aH
daH
dα
þ ∂K
tH
∂mL
dmL
dα
N0; and
ð47aÞ
dTH
dρ
¼ TH1
∂KtH
∂aH
daH
dρ
þ ∂K
tH
∂mL
dmL
dρ
 !
þ TH1
∂KtH
∂ρ þ T
H
2
∂ST
∂ρ : ð47bÞ
As in Section 3, Eq. (47a) indicates that relaxing the unskilled immigra-
tion quota augments terrorism in H. Eq. (47b) shows that if the directeffects of ρ on terrorism dominate the indirect effects arising out of
changes in the policy variables, a relaxation of the skilled immigration
quota must reduce terrorism against H. Using Eq. (43b) and the enve-
lope theorem, we get
duH
dα
¼ ∂u
H
∂α þ
∂uH
∂mL
dmL
dα
b 0;where
∂uH
∂α ¼−θ
∂TH
∂α b 0 and
∂uH
∂mL
¼−θ ∂T
H
∂mL
b 0:
ð48Þ
Eq. (48) is similar to Eq. (33).
Finally, the effect of the skilled immigration quota may be obtained
as
duH
dρ
¼ ∂u
H
∂ρ þ
∂uH
∂mL
dmL
dρ
;where
∂uH
∂ρ ¼−θ
∂TH
∂ρ N0: ð49Þ
Based on Eq. (46a), F's proactive response may fall when skilled
immigration rises. In that case, it is clear from Eq. (49) that H's utility
must rise. Otherwise, there is some ambiguity, but H's utility will rise
provided the direct effect of skilled immigration (i.e., the ﬁrst term on
the RHS of Eq. 49) outweighs the indirect effect working through F's
proactive choice.
7. The Stackelberg outcome for the defense-proactive game
It is useful to consider the Stackelberg outcome of the defense-
proactive game as a benchmark for comparison with Section 5. This
reconsideration generates Proposition 7:
Proposition 7. In the defense-proactive game, the leader H reduces its
defense relative to Nash if and only if its foreign interests are sufﬁciently
small. Nation F reduces its proactive measures if and only if H reduces
defense. In the absence of H's foreign interests, the leadership outcome
is a Pareto improvement over the Nash outcome. Terrorism in H is
higher in the leadership outcome if the direct effect of defense domi-
nates the indirect effects. Terrorism in Fmay either rise or fall.
Given Eq. (42c), H reduces its defense compared to Nash to induce
F to reduce mL. Reduction in H's defense also beneﬁts F. The formal
development of Proposition 7 follows.
If we replacemKwith aH in Eq. (25b) and use Eq. (43b), we then get
duH
daH
¼ ∂u
H
∂aH
þ ∂u
H
∂mL
 !
dmL
daH
 !
: ð50aÞ
Evaluating the above derivative at the Nash equilibrium and using
Eq. (42c), we have
duH
daH jNash
¼ ∂u
H
∂mL
 !
dmL
daH
 !
jNash
b 0; if and only if
∂uH
∂mL
¼−∂T
H
∂mL
−δH ∂T
F
∂mL
b 0:
ð50bÞ
When H's foreign interests are sufﬁciently small, ∂u
H
∂mL is negative, so that
duH
daH Nashj is negative, thus implying that, as a leader, H will reduce
defense below the Nash level. If, however, H has sufﬁciently extensive
foreign interests, this result is reversed and H will want to raise its
defense to induce F to raise its mL to contain terrorism abroad. Again,
consider Saudi Arabia. Given extensive US foreign interests there, it
will be useful for the United States to raise its defense at home to
encourage greater proaction by the Saudi government. This is not true
of Somalia.
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H's foreign interests, both nations' utility levels will be higher at leader-
ship than at Nash. As the leader reduces its defense, it elicits a reduction
in F's proactive efforts. Given the negative externality of F's proaction on
H (i.e., ∂u
H
∂mL b0, when δ
H = 0), H's utility must rise due to this change.
Moreover, a reduction in H's defense confers a positive spillover for F,
because defense creates negative terrorism deﬂection externalities for
F. As in Section 5, the movement from Nash to Stackelberg leads to a
Pareto improvement by reducing both H's defense and F 's proaction.
Both counterterrorism measures confer negative externalities, so that
they are overprovided at the Nash equilibrium. These inefﬁciencies are
reduced in the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Finally, we consider the effect on terrorism in H,
dTH
daH
¼ TH1
∂KtH
∂aH
þ ∂K
tH
∂mL
 !
dmL
daH
 !" #
: ð51Þ
The direct effect of defense is to reduce KtH (i.e., ∂K
tH
∂aH b0), but the indirect
effect works to raise mL through F 's reaction, and hence tends to raise
KtH. If the direct effect dominates, terrorism rises in H as defense is re-
duced in the Stackelberg outcome. Similarly, there are opposing
effects on F 's terrorism. A fall in H's defense will tend to reduce terror-
ism in F, but, in reaction to a fall in defense, mL also falls, and this
tends to increase terrorism in F.
8. Concluding remarks
Immigration and counterterrorismpolicies are both central concerns
confronting the United States and many other terrorist-targeted devel-
oped countries. Consistent with our model, numerous transnational
terrorist groups have taken up residency in developing countries with
limited capabilities to root out these groups. This paper is the ﬁrst
general equilibrium analysis with strategic aspects that investigates
the interrelationship between immigration quotas in the developed
country and counterterrorism efforts in the developing and developed
countries. We present two variants of the counterterrorism game. In
the ﬁrst, both countries apply proactive measures against the terrorists,
while, in the second, the developing country uses proactive measures
and the developed country relies on defensive measures. Even though
the alternativemeasures are strategic substitutes in the proactive repre-
sentation, and are amix of strategic complements and substitutes in the
defense-proactive representation, there is robustness with respect to
recommendations concerning labor quotas. For both games, the devel-
oped country can curtail its terrorism at home by limiting unskilled
labor quotas and increasing skilled labor quotas. This holds when the
developed country's interests and assets in the developing country are
not too great, which applies to many countries that harbor terrorists.
Despite complex interrelationships, the basic intuition for our ﬁndings
is clear. If, say, the United States brings in more skilled labor from, say,
Yemen, these immigrants are gainfully employed with a better quality
of life. When skilled labor quotas are more stringent, many stay in
Yemen with a lower standard of living, for which they may cross over
to the terrorist sector. The terrorist group relies on skilled labor to hit
targets in the developed country. On the contrary, the US restrictions
on unskilled immigration give rise to an opposite chain of events,
where terrorism is focused on the host developing country. By examin-
ing the terror-supply elasticity, we showed that relaxing skilled labor
quotas is especially effective for skill-scarce developing countries
hosting terrorist groups. Hence, we are not recommending that a devel-
oped country can ﬁght terrorism through a general relaxation of skilled
labor quotas; rather, this relaxation must be aimed at skill-scarce host
countries.
We also ﬁnd that a leadership role by the developed country amelio-
rates two forms of inefﬁcient counterterrorism choices in the two coun-
tries. Surprisingly, these Pareto-improving outcomes characterize bothgames when the Stackelberg equilibrium is compared to the Nash
equilibrium. These andother results stem froma rich set of international
externalities that are tied to counterterrorism and immigration quotas.
Our analysis not only identiﬁes novel externalities associated with
immigration policies, but it also shows that the propermix of immigrant
quotas can inﬂuence terrorism and counterterrorism. Our paper adds to
the immigration literature by identifying terrorism-reducing patterns of
immigration.
Appendix A. Mathematical
1. Derivation of Eqs. (26a) and (26b)
Recall from Section 2 that X ¼ X wuF
βL mLð Þ
 
andG ¼ G wsF
βS mSð Þ
 
. Based on
Eq. (24b) and the small country assumption, the wages,wjF ( j = H, F),
are constant. Using the implicit function theorem and Eqs. (25a)–(25b),
we get
∂uF
∂mL
¼ RF3 LF−α
  ∂X
∂mL
−∂T
F
∂mL
−1: ðM1Þ
From Dixit and Norman (1980), we know that the partial derivative of
the revenue function with respect to a factor endowment yields that
factor's reward. Thus, R3F, which is the partial with respect to F 's produc-
tive unskilled labor force, is F 's unskilled wage rate wuF. Since X is the
cumulative distribution function, its derivative is the probability density
function x. Therefore, we have
∂uF
∂mL
¼ wuF LF−α
  ∂X
∂mL
−∂T
F
∂mL
−1;where ∂X
∂mL
¼−
xwuFβL
′
mL
 
βL
 2 N0:
ðM2Þ
Eq. (26a) follows by substituting for ∂X/∂mL in Eq. (M2). The derivation
of Eq. (26b) is similar.
2. Derivation of Eq. (27b)
Based on Eqs. (26a) and (27a) and the implicit function theorem,we
have
∂mL
∂mK
¼
∂2T F
∂mL∂mK
" #
SOC F
; ðM3Þ
where SOCF b 0 is the second-order condition of F's optimization. Using
Eqs. (14b) and (15b), we have
∂T F
∂mK
¼ T F1 ð Þ
∂KtF
∂mK
;where
∂KtF
∂mK
¼
γHTH11Kβ
K ′ mK
 
D
b 0; ðM4Þ
D = γHT11H + γFT11F . For tractability, we use a second-order approxima-
tion (i.e., ignore third derivatives of the terrorism functions). Also, βK′ is
a function only ofmK. With this in mind, ∂K
tF
∂mK is independent of changes
in mL, so that differentiating Eq. (M4) with respect to mL yields
∂2T F
∂mL∂mK
¼ ∂K
tF
∂mK
 !
∂T F1
∂mL
 !
: ðM5Þ
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∂T F1
∂mL
¼ T F11
∂KtF
∂mL
þ T F12
∂LT
∂mL
;where
∂KtF
∂mL
¼− γ
FT F12
D
 !
∂LT
∂mL
 !
b 0 and
∂LT
∂mL
b 0:
ðM6Þ
Substituting the expression provided in the secondequality for∂K
tF
∂mL in the
ﬁrst equality above and simplifying, we have
∂T F1
∂mL
¼ γ
HTH11T
F
12
D
 !
∂LT
∂mL
 !
b 0: ðM7Þ
Recalling that ∂K
tF
∂mK b 0, and using Eq. (M7) in Eq. (M5), we have
∂2T F
∂mL∂mK
¼ ∂K
tF
∂mK
 !
∂T F1
∂mL
 !
N0: ðM8Þ
Substituting Eq. (M8) into Eq. (M3) yields
∂mL
∂mK
b 0: ðM9Þ
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